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ABSTRACT
Thispaper attempts to distinguish between two alternative views of
the labor market problems faced by young workers in a number of industrialized
countries in the 1970s and early 1980s. The first view is that the low
relative earnings and high unemployment rates experienced by these workers
were largely "age" related. Although this view carries the implication that
the problems will disappear for recent youth cohorts as they grow older, it
also implies that the problems will be "handed over" to successive waves of
youth cohorts as they enter the labor market. The second view is that the
labor market problems of recent youth cohorts are a consequence of their large
size. This view has very different implications since generational crowding
can permanently or temporarily depress the economic position of large cohorts
but need not have an adverse effect on later waves of smaller youth cohorts.
On the basis of a multi-country empirical analysis of patterns of
cohort size, earnings, unemployment, and the distribution of young workers
across industries, we have four main sets of findings to report.
First, the baby-boom was not uniformly experienced across OECO
economies -in terms of either its timing or magnitude. While some countries,
such as Canada, the U.S., and Belgium had large increases in the youth share of
the population from 1965 to 1980, others, notably Japan and Switzerland, had
large decreases.
Second, our empirical results indicate that large cohort size tends
to have a negative effect on the "expected relative earnings" of the cohort,
where expected relative earnings is defined as the product of the earnings and
the employment-to-labor force ratio of a young cohort relative to the same
product for an older cohort. There is, moreover, a marked trade—off between
the relative earnings effect and the relative employment effect with large
cohort sizes reducing relative earnings in some countries and reducing reia—
tive employment in others.
Third, at least for the U.S., the relatively low wages and high
unemployment of the "unlucky cohorts" tend to converge to the patterns that
would have resulted had the cohorts been more "normal" in size, with the con-
vergence occurring within a decade or so.
Fourth, our results show that baby-boom cohorts were absorbed in
the U.S. and other OECD economies quite evenly across a wide range of
industries. This finding contradicts the popular belief that large youth
cohorts were absorbed primarily through expansion of those industries that
have been traditionally youth-intensive.
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Introduction
It is now widely accepted that the large youth cohorts that
entered the labor markets of a number of countries in the 1970s have faced
serious economic problems. Most discussions treat these problems as "age" or
"youth" related, implying that they will disappear for current youths as they
grow older and will affect new smaller cohorts simply because of their age.
At the same time, recent public and professional discussion of the "baby boom"
generation has focused attention on the problems from a very different
perspective, which has different implications for policy; namely that the
current group of youths suffer from "generational crowding't due to the size of
their cohort. Generational crowding can depress the economic position of large
cohorts permanently but need not adversely affect new smaller youth cohorts.
What are the facts about the demographic bulge? In which countries
has -it been most (least) marked? What is the evidence that it has altered the
economic position of baby boom youths? To what extent have labor markets in
different countries adjusted to the baby boom cohort in terms of reductions in
relative wages, and to what extent in terms of worsened employment
opportunities? What does the evidence suggest about the possible long term
generational problems faced by the baby boom cohorts?
I. The Baby Boom BulQe: Magnitude and Economic Effect
Because fertility patterns have differed markedly across developed
countries, there is a striking difference in the pattern of "baby boom" bulges
in the OECD economies, producing quite different age structures of the
population with potentially different effects on job markets.—2-
Table 1 provides a general overview of the different demographic
bulges in OECD countries from 1965—1980 and for historical comparison,
1950-1965, as well. It records the percentage of 15-24 year olds in the
population by five year intervals. The data show a wide range of country
experiences which we have crudely categorized into one of four groups, ordered
by the importance of the "baby boom" in the 1965-1980 period:
(1) Those countries with a large and increasing youth percentage in
the 1965-1980 period: the unweighted average mean youth percentage in this
category was 18.0 in 1980, an increase of 2.5 points from its 1965 average of
15.5.
(2) Those countries with sizeable or moderately increasing youth
shares: an unweighted mean youth percentage of 16.1 in 1980, up from 14.7 in
1965.
(3) Those countries with no noticeable change in the youth
percentage (average 15.0 in 1980, 15.2 in 1965).
(4) Those countries with a marked decrease in the youth percentage
(14.3 in 1980; 17.5 in 1965).
Observe that each group contains a fair number of countries. Observe
also the wide range of changes and levels across countries. The demographic
youth bulge -is important in a number of countries but not in all. Indeed, there
are five countries in our last category, where youth employment shares of the
population fall markedly in 1965-1980, most notably Japan and Switzerland. The
different patterns indicate that the baby boom and potential generational
crowding is a potentially important labor market problem in some countries only,
particularly the English-speaking overseas countries (U.S., Canada, New Zealand,—3—
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Source: OECD Demographic Indicators of Countries, 1979, and UN World
Population Prospects, 1985.-4-
Australia) though also in Belgium, Ireland and Portugal as shown in the table.
We shall refer to the countries in the first group as 'baby boom" countries,
although some -in the second group could also be so labelled.
In terms of understanding the "youth problem" the diverse country
experiences provide valuable "experiments" for comparison1 and suggest the
potential of cross-country analyses to contribute to our knowledge of the
economics of the problem.-5-
II. What are the Economic Effects of a Large Entering Cohort?
That the entry of a large cohort on the job market depresses economic
opportunities for that cohort has received wide acceptance among analysts. As
long as workers of different ages are imperfect substitutes in production, an
increase in the supply of one age cohort will, by simple supply—demand analysis,
adversely affect its economic position. In general, the effect of increased
cohort size can show up either in the wages and occupational position of that
cohort or in their unemployment (or labor force participation) levels. The
magn-itude of the two effects will depend on a variety of factors including the
shape of the labor supply and labor demand curves, public policy related to the
labor market, and macroeconomic trends and conditions. For example, the more
elastic is labor demand, the lesser the effect of a large cohort on wages.
Alternatively, the existence of a minimum wage that exceeds the market wage
implies that the effects of cohort size will tend to show up in the form of
increased unemployment. Of course, public policy can also mitigate the adverse
economic effects of large cohort size, for example, by increasing the incentives
for members of a large cohort to stay in school or to join the military.
Finally, conditions in the macroeconomy may be such that a large cohort of
workers can be absorbed into the labor force without any negative effects on
their wages or employment. Even the expansion of particular sectors of an eco-
nomy, in which the demand for labor from large (youth) cohorts is high, can
moderate the otherwise adverse effects of large cohort size.
It is also worth noting that the effect of large cohort size can
change over time. For example, suppose the wages in some labor market tend to
exceed the market clearing level for young and inexperienced workers, but not—6—
for older experienced workers (perhaps because of a government-set minimum
wage). In this situation, a large cohort will suffer relatively high
unemployment with little relative wage decline when it enters the labor market,
with moderation of the unemployment effect and magnification of the wage effect
occurring as it ages.
As another example, the effect of large cohort size can either be
aggravated or mitigated by coincidental changes in the labor force participation
rates of other demographic groups. For example, in countries like the U.S.,
Canada, Australia, Great Britain, and Sweden, the dramatic increase in the labor
force participation rates of women occurred at roughly the same time as large
birth cohorts reached labor force age. By contrast, industrialized countries
such as Germany and Japan have experienced little or no change in rates of
female labor force participation over the past 25 years (See Table 2). If these
trends are independent of the changed numbers of youths, they could have
substantial independent effects on the economic position of the incoming young
workers. If women are substitutes for youths in production, the position of
youths will be worse in countries with rising participation, and conversely if
the women are complementary inputs. Similarly, the falling labor force
participation rates of older men (i.e., aged 55 and over) in a country like the
U.S. could be expected to affect the prospects for the large entering cohorts.
Table 3 presents a review of the empirical studies that have been
conducted on the effects of cohort size on earnings and unemployment. Most of
the studies refer to the U.S. experience, although the Oooley study looks at
earnings effects in Canada, the Ben-Porath study looks at earnings and
unemployment effects in Israel, and the OECD study looks at unemployment effects-7-
Table 2: Female Labor Force Participation Rates in Selected OECD Countries,
1965-1983
Country 1965 1970 1975 1980 1983
Canada 35.3 41.1 50.5 57.8 60.8
United States 45.7 50.4 54.9 61.3 63.4
Japan 55.8 55.4 51.7 54.9 572
Australia 34.8* 45.6 49.7 52.5 51.8
Finland 62.6 61.5 65.7 70.0 73.5
France 45.7 49.8 52.9 55.6 55.8
Germany 48.8 48.1 49.7 50.0 49.6
Italy 31.0 29.1 29.9 39.2 40.2
Netherlands na 258a 27.0 30.3 34.3
Norway na 517a 54.6 64.7 68.1
Portugal na na 50.6 54.9
Spain na 335 33.7 35.0
Sweden 55.4 60.6 68.9 75.7 78.3
UK 50.0 52.8 57.5 59.8 59.1
Source: OECD Labor Force Statistics 1962-1982 except *fromU.S. Department
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-in ten industrialized countries. In many respects these studies are difficult
to compare. They use widely varying data (e.g., aggregate time-series data vs.
microdata); they define key variables in significantly different ways (e.g.,
cohorts are defined in terms of year of birth in some studies andyear of entry
into the labor force in other studies; they are defined relative to avarying
set of other cohorts; and sometimes the cohort size measure is smoothedby
defining it as a moving average of adjacent cohort sizes); and they use dif-
ferent empirical specifications and estimation techniques (e.g., sometimes
trend variables are included and sometimes they are not; some studiesstratify
their data by education while others do not; some studies involve simple least
squares regressions while others use highly structured and restrictive factor
analytic models). In addition, since few studies report results of estimating
alternative models, it is difficult to gauge their robustness withrespect to
the conclusions they reach.
Despite these differences across studies, two clear areas of
agreement do emerge. First, in the U.S., Canada, and Israel, the labor market
entry of relatively large cohorts did result -in a decline in the earnings
of those cohorts relative to the earnings of older and smaller cohorts.
Second, the labor market entry of large cohorts tended to result in increased
relative unemployment in most countries.
Figures 1A and lB plot the average earnings of young males relative
to adult males over the years 1966-84 for seven OECD countries for which data
are available (although the number of years of data varies somewhat by country).
Figure lA plots these data for the U.S., Australia, and Canada-—-all countries
which fall into our first category of countries: those with large andrising-17-
FiqureIA: Earnings of Youths Relative to Adults, Hales,
196—1984, Baby-bow Countries (Ratios)
vs
Youth Australia
Earningsf -•r_ — —
Adult .65 1
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Sources: See Table A.3, Appendix II.-18-
youth percentages of the population. Figure 18 plots these data for countries
which did not experience such dramatic baby booms. It includes France, which
fits intoour second category, the U.K. (our third category), and Sweden and
Japan1 which had declines in the youth percentage.
The striking feature of Figures 1A and 18 is that the U.S. is the
only country in which there is a dramatic decline in relative earnings. Indeed,
Australia is the only other country which shows even some evidence of relative
earnings decline. In contrast, relative earnings of youth in all of the other
countries are either quite stable or increasing over time. These patterns
suggest that the effect of cohort size on relative earnings may vary by country
or may be "overpowered" by other factors (union wage policy, minimum wages, and
so on).
As an example of the diversity of different countries' experiences,
consider the patterns of change in the U.S. and Australia versus that in Canada.
The U.S. and Canada had a larger increase in the size of their youth cohorts
than Australia. Whereas the declines in relative earnings in the U.S. and
Australia are consistent with the sizeable baby boom bulge in the U.S. and the
moderate bulge in Australia, the absence of a decline is suprising in the case
of Canada.
In Japan and Sweden, the increases in relative youth earnings
are consistent with the evidence of proportionate declines in the number of
young workers reported in Table 1.In addition, there is little change in rela-
tive earnings in France, which is consistent with the small change in the pro-
portion of young workers. Finally, the U.K.'s growth in relative earnings is
curious given the lack of change in the relative proportion of young workers.-19-
Here, the relative earnings growth can apparently be explained by the institu—
tionally determined increase in youth apprentice rates.
One problem with interpreting Figures 1A and lB in terms of the gross
correlation between relative cohort size and relative earnings is that it fails
to consider the second key dimension of adjustment: unemployment. Thus, in
Figures 2A and 2B we have plotted relative youth unemployment rates (i.e., the
ratio of unemployment rates of males aged 15 (or 16)- 24 to males aged 25-54)
over time for the same countries as in Figures 1A and lB. The most interesting
pattern in these Figures is the decline in relative unemployment rates in the
U.S. The decline for the U.S. is consistent with the decline in relative
earnings shown -in Figure 1A and suggests that the effect of the baby boom was
felt mainly on earnings in the U.S. and not on unemployment.
One other feature of Figures 2A and 2B worth noting is that relative
unemployment rates do not decrease for any country except the U.S. For example,
it is interesting to note that relative youth unemployment was higher in the
U.S. than in any of the other countries in 1967. By 1983, however, relative
youth unemployment was lor, in the U.S. than -in any of the other countries. On
the other hand, in Japan,Sweden, and France, where simple economic theory would
lead one to expect thattbe large deciine in the proportion of young males would
result in increased relative earnings ordecreased relative unemployment, the
relative unemployment rate increases only slightly. Overall, the Figures
indicate that the magnitude of the wage adjustment in the U.S. has been
substantial whereas the evidence for the other countries suggests a greater
impact on relative youth joblessness. However, the experience depicted is rich
enough to make -it clear that responses to population changes are not uniform,-20-
but rather depend upon economic institutions and circumstances.'
To summarize the unemployment and wage patterns shown in the Figures
and to relate them to cohort size, we have estimated a two equation model.
In the first equation the dependent variable is the log of expected
relative wages—- the product of the wages paid youths and one minus the youth
unemployment rate divided by the product of the wages paid adults and one
minus the adult unemployment rate. Cohort size effects that operate on either
unemployment or wages will be captured by this dependent variable. For the
sample of countries shown in Figures 1 and 2, we regress this dependent variable
on five independent variables: the log of the ratio of young to older men in
the relevant age groups-—our measure of relative cohort size; a linear trend, to
capture any trend factors such as technological change that might affect youth
unemployment or wages; the log of the male adult unemployment rate, to capture
cyclical factors; the log of female labor participation to capture the increased
female work activism independent of demographic factors; and country dummy
variables (omitting the U.S.); and a constant term. The results of the
calculations, shown in column (1) of Table 4 reveal significant cohort, cycle,
trend, and country effects. The elasticity of expected relative wages to our
relative cohort measure is a sizeable -.22,a magnitude comparable to those
obtained in individual country studies of the effect of cohort size on relative
wages or unemployment, analysed separately.
Our second equation explores the tradeoff between relative wages and
relative unemployment by regressing the log of youth to adult unemployment on the
1For a discussion of youth unemployment in France, United Kingdom,Germany,
Canada, and the U.S. which addresses circumstances particular to each country,
see The Nature of Youth Unemployment, An Analysis for Policy-Makers, OECD, 1984-21-
Table 4: Coefficients and Standard Errors of the Effect of Relative Cohort Size
on rExpected Relative Wages' and of the Tradeoff Between Relative Wages and
Relative Unemployment, Male Workers
The Dependent Variable: log relative expected Log relative unemploy-
wage, (youth/adults) ment rate (youth/adults)
Independent Variables: (1) (2)
log relative cohort size -.22 -
(.11)
log adult male unemploy- -.16 -.08
ment rate (.02) (.05)
Time .004 .018
(.004) (.006)
log relative wage, 1.39
(youth/adult) (.20)
log female labor .04 -.37
participation rate (.15) (.22)
Constant 3.68 —4.43
(.39) (1.00)














Note: The dependent variable in (1) is defined as log of youth wage x(1 -youth
unemployment rate) divided by adult wage x(1-adult unemployment rate). The
deleted country in the set of dummy variables is the U.S. See the appendix for
exact data and definitions.-22- -
logof relative wages, time, and the log of the adult male unemployment rate and
the log of the female participation rate. As can be seen -in column (2), we
obtain a highly significant and sizeable positive coefficient on relative wages.
Thus, a country in which relative youth wages increased tended to "pay" for this
increase with higher relative youth unemployment. In short, our data show that
cohort effects alter the relative economic position of youths and reveal a
tradeoff between unemployment and wages. However, without detailed analysis of
institutions, policies, and perhaps industrial developments in individual
countries we are unable to explain why countries have arrived at different
points on the "tradeoff't demand curve.
In order to probe more deeply into the responses of different
economies to variations in cohort size, we have calculated the change in the
proportion of young workers by industry over recent time periods. These
statistics are reported in Table 5 for males and females separately in the U.S.:
Japan, Germany, and Sweden, and for both sexes in France and Norway. In
connection with this table, the first interesting question to ask is whether or
not the wage and unemployment declines in the U.S. can be attributed to the
sizeable growth of low-wage service jobs. For example, from 1970 to 1980, 87
percent of the growth of private sector jobs in the U.S. occurred in the
service—producing industries, defined broadly to include all sectors but mining,
manufacturing, and construction.2 (By contrast, growth of employment in
services in Europe has been rather modest.)
For young male workers -in the U.S., what stands out in the first
2Calculated by taking the change in service employment dividedby the change in
total employment in the private sector, U.S. Department of Labor, Employment and


















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































column of Table 5 is the extraordinary increase in the proportions of youths in
each industry. Whereas many have argued that much of the absorption of youths
into the U.S. work force occurred via expansion of "traditional" youth intensive
industries, with the proportions of youths in the industries changing only
modestly, the opposite turns out to be the case: the U.S. employed its
increased male youth population in a wide variety of sectors, with youth
employment coefficients rising substantially everywhere.
To quantify this finding we decompose the growth of youth employment
into three components using the following simple identity
(1) LY =£a M. +EI.a.+EAIAa
where AY =changein youth employment, 1970 -1980.
=shareof workers in industry jwhowere young in 1970
=employmentin industry jin1970
=changefrom 1970 to 1980
This decomposition breaks the growth of youth employment into:
(1) Growth due to expansion of youth employment industries;
(2) Growth due to changes in youth intensity of employment within
industries; and
(3) Interaction effects.
As can be seen in the first row of Table 6, the decomposition shows
that increased youth intensity coefficients, rather than changes in industry
distribution, are the main factors underlying the overall changes in the youth
share of jobs in the U.S. In particular, the decomposition for the U.S.
attributes all of the growth of male youth employment to changes in youth
intensity within industries; the bulk of the growth of female youth employment—25- -
isalso due to the changes in youth intensity within industries. The negative
interaction terms show that the proportionate increase of youths (both men and
women) in expanding industries was smaller than in declining industries, even
though the absolute increase was greater in the expanding industries.
Table 6 also decomposes the growth of youth unemployment for five
other countries. The key result is that1 as in the U.S., changes in youth
intensity across industries, rather than the change in the size of youth
intensive industries, is responsible for the overall change in youth employment
shares in each economy. This is true -in cases where the youth share of
employment has fallen sharply, as -in Japan, as well as -in cases where changes
are more moderate.
In sum, evidence on employment of persons by age across industries
tends to support the view that the bulk of adjustment to changes in cohort size





































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































III. Permanent or Transitory Economic Effects of Generational Crowding?
Consider the economic situation of a large cohort that enters the job
market and suffers poor wages or employment prospects as a consequence of
"generational crowding.t' As the cohort ages will it "catch-up" to the position
it would have held had it been smaller, or will it fall further behind?
The question of the transitory or permanent nature of the economic
problems faced by the baby-boom generation is a difficult one that has just
begun to receive theoretical and empirical attention.
The problem is difficult for three reasons. First, the baby-boom
generation has been in the job market in the U.S. and some other countries for
only a decade or so. Twenty or thirty years from now economic historians will
have full life-cycle cohort income profiles to study. We do not. Second, there
is an inherent confounding of cohort effects and macroeconomic (or period)
effects.In other words, the "baby-boomers" moved into the job market in
the 1970s, a period of exceptionally low productivity and real wage growth in
the U.S. and of low productivity and employment growth in Europe as well. It is
by no means easy to factor out the differential effect of cohort size and
sluggish macro-economic development on cohort progress in the job market.
Third, we lack sufficient knowledge of the degree of substitutability of workers
by age to make definite statements about how the demand for workers of different
ages changes as they age. One possibility is that as workers specialize, they
become less substitutable. Another possibility is that persons with work
experience are less distinguishable and thus better substitutes for persons in
different cohorts than are new entrants. Welch, in particular, has argued that
the depressing effects of large cohort size on wages are diminished as members-28-
of the large cohort "optimize" around the crowding problem they face (e.g., via
different human capital decisions, increased migration, etc.)
These considerations suggest three dramatically different possible
scenarios for "baby-boom generation'1 cohorts as they age (See Figure 3). First,
the "baby-boom" cohort can make "normal" progress as it ages, neithercatching
up with its position had it been a smaller cohort nor losing further ground.
Standard human capital investment considerations would, for example,suggest
that such profiles might be "normal" for baby boomers, to the extent thatoppor-
tunities are depressed in both learning and earning situations by generation
size. In this sense, being a member of a large cohort depresses the level but
does not tilt the shape of a "longitudinal" cohort age-earnings profile.
Second, it is possible that the large supply of persons of the givenage will
"clog" up promotion possibilities, leading to earlier "plateauing" of persons
along their career paths and further losses in earnings relative to where the
cohort otherwise would have been. In particular, standard job ladder models
suggest slower promotions and earnings growth as the large generation competes
for a relatively fixed number of higher level jobs incompany hierarchies.
Third, the cohort may enjoy rapid progress as it ages, as persons move out of
low-level jobs into more "normal" jobs, leading to at least some "catch-up." In
other words, catch-up may take place because the cohort makes schooling and
labor market decisions which help to dampen the adverse effects of its size. In
addressing the extent to which substitution among age groups rises with age, one
anticipates smaller effects of generational crowding as the cohort ages.
The position of a particular group in the age structure of the work
force --whetherthey are preceded by a relatively large (small) cohort orBaby boom cohort starts out
worse off but "catches up"
Baby boom cohort starts
out worse off and follows
normal path
Baby boom cohort starts out




Figure :PossibleEffects of Cohort Size




followedby a relatively large (small) cohort --isalso likely to affect their
progress. The tail end of the baby boom might, for instance, be expected to
face longer term and more serious difficulties than cohorts born at the
beginning of the baby boom. Tailenders run the dual danger of facing a job
market with clogged promotion possibilities and only a small number of new
entrants that they could be expected to supervise.
The basic fact about the progress of the U.S. baby boom in the 1970s
is simple: they have experienced much lower percentage wage increases as they
have aged than have previous cohorts (see Figure 4), producing lower relative
wages for the groups as they mature.3 This fact is revealed by considering the
difference between real median income growth of young workers and that of older
workers in the post World War Two period. Figure 4 shows that this difference
was fairly constant before the baby-boom cohorts began to enter the labor market
(the ratio of 25—34 year olds to 25+ year olds was 23.7% in 1950, 23.4% in 1960,
and 23.9% in 1970), then dropped sharply in the mid 1970s (when the ratio of 25
to 34 year olds to 25+ year olds jumped to 27.4% by 1975, indicating theentry
of baby-boom children into the labor market).
Population projections indicate that the ratio of 25-34 year olds to
25+ year olds has risen to about 30% as of 1985 and will remain almost at that
level until 1990. Thus, 25-34 year olds will continue to face labor market
crowding in the near future.
However, in light of the difficulties alluded to earlier it is
perhaps not surprising that there is considerable disagreement among analysts
3We have reported differences inpercentage changes in wages because these are
the relevant differences for analysing changes in relativewages --i.e.
percentage change in wages of 25-34/wages of all men 25+ is approximately equal
to the difference in the percentage change in the two wages.-31—
Figure 4: Difference in Percentage Increases in Real Median Incomes
of Male Workers Aged 25 -34and 25+ Over Three Decades*
23%
20%















1973 and 35 —
44in 1983
19%
Source: 1949, 1959, 1969, U.S. Census of Population 1950, 1960, 1970,
Educational Attainment Volumes. 1973, 1979, 1983 from U.S. Bureau
of Census, Current Population Reports Series P-60.










25+ 40% 32% -4% -9%-32- -
regardingthe permanence of generational crowding effects. The studies by Welch,
Tan and Ward, and 000ley estimate similar empirical models using data for the
U.S. and Canada and report results which show some "catch-up." In contrast to
these studies, Berger presents theoretical arguments which suggest that optimal
human capital decisions will not necessarily result in the reduction of cohort
size effects on earnings, and presents an empirical analysis which suggests that
the negative effect of cohort size on earnings increases with experience,
contrary to the findings of Welch and others.4
Freeman has presented evidence that "catch-up" is not complete while
in an earlier study, Ruggles and Ruggles found that the "depression" generation
suffered some permanent economic losses compared to workers who entered the
market in World War II in the U.S., but that those effects were modest.
However, the depression generation carried with it the effects of poor starting
jobs, but not of generational crowding.
As our contribution to the debate over which of the three scenarios
outlined in Figure 3 best fits the experience of U.S. baby boom cohorts, we
traced the earnings progress of several age cohorts in the period 1969-1984
using Current Population Survey tapes. These data permit comparisons of persons
in their late twenties and early thirties at the outset of the baby boom bulge
in the labor market with similarly aged persons who entered the labor market
during the 1970s; they also permit comparisons of persons in their early and mid
twenties who were part of the first wave of baby boomers with that of similarly
aged persons later in the wave. There are diverse ways to contrast these
4Since Berger's data and empirical model are identical to those of Welch,except
for the relaxation of certain restrictive assumptions in Welch's study, Berger's
results indicate that studies of the "catch—up hypothesis" may be quite
sensitive to their assumptions and empirical design.-33-
various groups; we have chosen to compare the progress of individuals in"young"
cohorts with that of individuals in cohorts twelveyears older in the period
covered.
Empirical Findings: Earnings
Tables 7A and lB report the percent wage gaps between selectedyouth
cohorts (i.e., 17—20, 21-24, 25—28, 29-32, 33—36, and 37—40) and cohorts that
are twelve years older than them (i.e., 29—32, 33-36, 37-40, 41-44, 45—48, and
49-52). These gaps are reported in Table 7A for U.S. males (white and nonwhite)
for the years 1969, 1973, 1977, 1981, and 1984 (although the statistics for
1984 actually refer to cohorts one year younger, in order topreserve the
cohort, as opposed to the age, comparisons). Table lB reports a similar set of
statistics for females. The data used to compute the statistics in these tables
are drawn from the May versions of the Current Population Survey in the
corresponding years. All individuals with positive earnings are included in the
sample.
To facilitate the interpretation of the statistics in Tables 8A and
8B, we have marked cohorts that were born at various stages of the baby boom
(e.g., the superscript "e" refers to the early baby- boom cohorts, "rn" to middle
baby-boom cohorts, and "1" to late baby-boom cohorts). Unmarked figures refer to
non—baby-boom cohorts that were born prior to 1945 or after 196. These will be
taken as our reference cases (i.e., normal-sized cohorts). Comparisons are made
between cohorts twelve years apart in order to make efficient use of the Current
Population Survey data given available sample sizes, the range of years covered
by the May version of the Survey, and our interest in analyzing wage gaps bet-
ween baby-boom youth cohorts and non-baby-boom older cohorts.-34-
Table 7A: Percent Hourly Earnings* Gap Between Youth Cohorts
and Older Cohorts, Males
Young Old Year
Cohort Cohort 1969 1973 1977 1981 1984**
17-20 29-32 _348m _47•4m _505l -46.8 -51.6
21-24 33-36 _164e _268m _34•gm 3541 _434
25-28 37—40 —1.8 .110e 254m .205m _29.61
29-32 41—44 2.5 -1.4 _113e 165m
33-36 45-48 3.0 -4.6 -2.1 -58e 79111
37-40 49-52 1.7 2.3 1.1 -0.1 0.5
*Calculated as usual weekly earnings divided by usual hours per week;
includes only individuals with positive usual weekly earnings.
**All calculations for 1984 are made using cohorts one year younger (e.g.
20-23 instead of 21-24) so as to preserve css-time comparisons within
cohorts.
eEarly baby boom cohort (youth cohort born 1945-1946).
mMiddle baby boom cohort (youth cohort born 1949-1952 or 1953-1956).
ftate baby boom cohort (youth cohort born 1957-196).*Calculated as usual weekly earnings divided by usual hours per week;
includes only individuals with positive usual weekly earnings.
**All calculations for 1984 are made using cohorts one year younger (e.g.
20—23 instead of 21—24) so as to preserve crss-time comparisons within
cohorts.
eEarly baby boom cohort (youth cohort born 1945-1946).
mMiddle baby boom cohort (youth cohort born 1949-1952 or 1953-1956).
1Late baby boom cohort (youth cohort born 1957-1963).
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-44.9
- 8•8e - 53m —19.6 34g
—11.1 2•ge — 21m 58m
0.4 75 47e 43m 45m
— 6.7 2.5 35.6 97e 132m
- 0.8 4.2 4.5 73e-36- -
Theresults for U.S. males in Table 7A show, first, a substantially
larger hourly earnings gap for baby-boom cohorts than for pre-baby-boom cohorts.
(It is a bit difficult to make comparisons with post-baby-boom youth cohorts
since the older cohorts -in these cases are not always normal-sized (e.g., the
33—36 year olds in 1981 and the 32-35 year olds in 1984 were baby-boom
cohorts)). In 1969, for example, 21-24 year olds (who were born during the
years 1945-48) had hourly earnings that were 16.4 percent less, on average, than
33—36 year olds (who were born during the years 1933—1936). This gap is much
larger than the 1.8 percent gap, also in 1969, between 25-28 year olds and 37—40
year olds (the former cohort being born during the years 1941-44, prior to the
baby boom). Of course, this type of finding is not by itself sufficient to
demonstrate that cohort size has an adverse effect on wages. For example, it
might simply reflect the fact that wage differences between age groups that are
a fixed number of years apart typically decline as the base age increases (i.e.,
that the most rapid growth of wages occurs at the relativelyyoung ages).
However, our second major finding suggests that there is indeed a cohort size
effect. In particular, Table 7A reveals larger wage gaps for the middle and
late baby-boom cohorts than for the early baby-boom cohorts, controlling for
age. For example, the earnings gap of 16.4 percent between 21-24 and 33-36 year
olds in 1969 increased to 26.8 percent and 34.9 percent in 1973 and 1977.
Indeed, since the 21-24 year olds in these years were born further into the baby
boom, during the years when the number of births climbed almost to the peak of
the baby boom, these patterns tend to provide relatively strong evidence of a
cohort size effect on hourly earnings. Observe that, with few exceptions, the
wage gap is larger for cohorts born further into the baby boom than for the-37—
early baby-boom cohorts. This observation also holds for the 17-20year olds in
Table 7A, although we are hesitant to place much weighton this evidence since
it relates to individuals whose labor force attachment isnot characterized by a
great deal of permanence.
Finally, the wage gaps in Table 7A all tend to decline asage
increases, for both synthetic cohorts (i.e., the columns of Table 7A) andactual
cohorts (i.e., the downward sloping diagonals of Table 7A). Observe alsothat
the wage gaps narrow more (both proportionately andabsolutely) for the
baby-boom cohorts than for the non-baby-boom cohorts, providing evidence that
the wages received by the baby-boom cohorts are catchingup with those they
would have received if their cohort size had been smaller.Nevertheless, the
hourly earnings gaps for the baby-boom cohorts were not eliminated by the time
they reached ages 29—32 in 1977 and 1981, suggesting that they had onlypartly
compensated for the effects of their large sizes.
Table 7B provides estimates of the correspondingwage gaps for
females. In general, the results show a similar pattern to those in Table7A,
with the hourly earnings gaps tending to be larger for thebaby-boom cohorts
than for the non-baby-boom cohorts. In addition, the figures also showsome
evidence of catchup in relative earnings. However, these resultsare
substantially less clearcut than the results for the males. We suspect that
these differences are associated with the fact that cohort sizewas not the most
important supply-side change in the labor market for women during theyears
1969-1984. Rather, changing labor force participation rates were far more
significant. For example, the labor force participation rate of 25-28year old
women increased from 34.9 percent in 1969 to 58.7 percent in 1981. In contrast,38- -
areasonable measure of the magnitude of the cohort size variation associated
with the baby boom --thechange in the ratio of 25-28 year olds to 17-40 year
olds between 1969 and 1981 --amountedto only 1.3 percentage points (i.e., the
ratio increased from 16.4 percent to 17.7 percent). Underlying this dramatic
increase in female labor force participation are complex economic and social
forces which determine female labor supply. These forces include (1) changing
tastes and preferences of women viz-a--viz labor and leisure, (2) the advent and
increasingly widespread use of effective contraception, (3) changes in women's
relative wages, (4) changes in the earnings of male family members, (5) changing
government policies such as those involving affirmative action, child care,
etc., and (6) structural shifts in the demand for labor associated with the
shift from a manufacturing-based economy to a service-based economy and the
growth of part-time and otherwise flexible employment.
Empirical Findings: Unemployment
To analyze the extent to which unemployment -is a consequence of
generational crowding, and the degree to which this type of unemployment per-
sists over time, we have prepared Tables 8A and 8B. These tables report dif-
ferences in unemployment rates for males (8A) and females (8B) for the same
youth and older cohorts as in Tables 7A and 7B. The figures for the males in
Table BA reveal a number of interesting patterns. First, the unemployment gaps
are especially large for the younger cohorts in all five years. This reflects
the fact that unemployment profiles tend to fall sharply early in the life cycle
and then gradually level off. Second, and of greater importance to us, the
unemployment gaps tend to be higher for the middle and late baby-boom cohorts-39-
Table 8A: Differences in Unemployment Rates* Between Youth Cohorts
and Older Cohorts, Males
Young Old Year
Cohort Cohort 1969 1973 1977 1981 1984**
17-20 29—32 580m 727m 7571 9.85 7.38
21-24 33—36 298e 534m 7.071 537!
25-28 37—40 1.24 137e 184m 162m 2.591
29-32 41-44 -.39 .31 81e 268m
33-36 45-48 —.28 -.03 .19 87e 52m
37—40 49—52 —2.5 .22 —.15 .71 115e
*Calculated as the unemployment rate of the young cohort minus the
unemployment rate of the old cohort.
**All calculations for 1984 are made using cohorts one year younger (e.g.
20-23 instead of 21-24) so as to preserve cross-time comparisons within
cohorts.
eEarly baby boom cohort (youth cohort born 1945-1946).
mMiddle baby boom cohort (youth cohort born 1949-1952 or 1953-1956).
Late baby boom cohort (youth cohort born 1957-196).*Calculated as the unemployment rate of the young cohort minus the
unemployment rate of the old cohort.
**All calculations for 1984 are made using cohorts one year younger (e.g.
20-23 instead of 21-24) so as to preserve cross-time comparisons within
cohorts.
eEarly baby boom cohort (youth cohort born 1945—1946).
mMiddle baby boom cohort (youth cohort born 1949-1952 or 1953—1956).
'Late baby boom cohort (youth cohort born 1957-1963).
-40-
Table 8B: Differences in Unemployment Rates* Between Youth Cohorts

















1969 1973 1977 1981 1984**
511m 498m 5.461 6.091 3.62
129e 2•86m 167m 3971 383
—.32 146e 52m 267m 1.321
-.19
—.83 -69e 176m 03m
-.41
—.29 1.26 179e 42m
43 -.05 -.02 .31
—-41-
than for the pre- and early baby-boom cohorts. To illustrate, consider the dif-
ferences in the unemployment rates of 21-24 year olds and 33-36 year olds. In
1969 this difference was 2.98 percent, whereas it was 5.34 percent in 1973, 6.97
percent in 1977, and 7.07 percent in 1973. This pattern of worsening relative
unemploynent as the baby-boom proceeds is shown in the figures for the youth
cohorts aged 17-20 and 25-28 as well. Thus, the figures in Table BA suggest
that unemployment is positively associated with cohort size.
The estimates in Table 8A also suggest that the increased
unemployment associated with large cohort size is not a permanent phenomenon.
For example, by the time the cohorts aged 21-24 and 33-33 in 1969 reached ages
29-32 and 41-44 in 1977, the 2.98 percentage point difference in their
unemployment rates had declined to less than one percentage point. Similarly,
by the time the cohorts aged 21-24 and 33-36 in 1973 had reached ages 32—35 and
44-47 in 1984, the difference in their unemployment rates had declined from 5.34
percentage points to just .52 percentage points. Thus, it appears that catch-up
in terms of the unemployment associated with large cohort size is complete
within roughly a decade of entry into the labor force.
The results for females in Table BB are qualitatively similar to
those for the men, although not as consistent with the notion that large cohort
size is associated with high unemployment. As with the men, the cross-sectional
results indicate that unemployment gaps between young and older workers tend to
decline with age, reflecting the concavity of age-unemployment profiles. In
addition, the unemployment gaps involving baby-boom cohorts also tend to be
larger than those involving pre-baby-boom cohorts. In contrast to the results
For men, there is no clear pattern of catch-up over time in Table 88. Rather,-42- -
thestatistics reveal strong patterns of cyclicality (e.g., 1973 was a high
point of the U.S. business cycle whereas 1981 was a relative low point). Thus,
the unemployment patterns of female cohorts are similar to the earnings patterns
for female cohorts insofar as they both seem to be less strongly influenced by
cohort size than by other economic factors.-43- -
IV.Implicationsfor the Future
There have been diverse speculations and predictions about the
economic effects of generational crowding for the future. For obviousreasons,
business concerns have focused on marketing issues, while demographers have
focused on implications for fertility and, to a lesser extent, labor force
participation. The "Easterlin hypothesis" regarding the effect of cohort size on
economic and demographic behavior has, in particular, generated considerable
academic interest. In this section we consider potential effects of continued
generational crowding on the labor market, fertility, and the relatively
neglected area of provision of social services. Wherever possible, we ground
our speculations on relevant empirical studies.
Labor Market
Generational crowding is likely to have some effects on the demand
and supply for workers of different types.
Our reading of evidence suggests that the effects of generational
crowding on the industrial and occupational composition of labor demand will be
modest. While there are definite differences in demand for goods byage groups,
the general result of most studies is that changes in consumption have relati-
vely modest effects on the industrial and occupational composition of labor
demand, save in a few sectors --suchas education and construction. One reason
for this is that interindustry linkages translate particular final goods demands
into demand for goods and labor in many sectors. In the case of the baby boom
cohort, their lower relative income has further reduced their potential impact
on the demand for final goods. Finally, enough other factors ranging from-44-- -
technologyto trade influence composition of output and demands for labor that
we forsee no dramatic effects of the baby—boom bulge on the composition of
demand for labor.
We anticipate larger labor market effects on post-baby boom cohorts,
with the change from a relative surplus to a relative shortage of entry-level
workers likely to cause a s-izeable upswing in the fortunes ofyoung workers. To
be sure, the first of the post-baby boom cohorts will face some competition from
the baby-boomers. However, extant analyses of the impact of the number of
persons of different ages on the wages of others suggests either positive or
modest negative spi]lover effects, so that the dominant factor will be the
shortfall of entry level workers. Indeed, in view of the importance ofyoung
workers -in interindustry mobility, as cohort size diminishes we believe there
will be a need for additional job training of the larger older cohorts to
facilitate adjustment to changing technology and demands.
Fertility
One of the most striking features of post-World War II fertility
patterns in Western Europe and the United States -is their tendency to decline.
These patterns have become the focus of considerable debateamong economists. At
issue is the question of whether the decline is temporary orpermanent. For
example, Easterliri has developed a cohort size theory of fertility behavior.
According to this theory, when cohort size is large, employment opportunities
are relatively poor, incomes are low relative to aspirations (which are formed
by childhood "standards of living" in one's parents' household), and couples
substantially curtail childbearing because the demand for children is highly-45- -
elasticwith respect to the difference between income and aspirations.In
contrast to this theory, which predicts that fertility will increaseonce the
small size youth cohorts (i.e., the children of the baby-boomgeneration) enter
the labor market, Butz and Ward have developed a traditional microeconom-icmodel
which suggests that fertility declines are the result ofpermanent increases in
the demand for female labor (i.e., the increased demand leads tohigher wages
paid to women, thereby increasing the opportunity cost of childbearing and
childrearing, which results in lower fertility). Butz and Ward alsosuggest,
however, that women will tend to time their childbearing to coincide with
periods during which their incentive to work (i.e., their wage) is low. Thus,
to the extent that generational crowding depresses earnings (as our earlier
results imply), the Butz and Ward model suggests that increasedfertility
(albeit around a downward sloping trend line) is likely to result. Thus, the
two ma-in economic models of fertility have quite different implications for the
effect of generational crowding, with the Easterlin theoryemphasizing income
effects and predicting a rise in fertility and the Butz and Wardtheory
emphasizing substitution effects and predicting further declines in the
fertility of children of the baby boom generation. To date, empirical
economists have not been able to convincingly argue that either model is
superior. Nonetheless, is is true that fertility rates have increased in
several countries (including the U.S.) since the late 1970s, providing some
support for the Easterlin model. However, as Bloom and Trussell have argued,
the increase may well be due to changes in the time of fertility (i.e.,delayed
childbearers are now reaching their desired ages of childbearing) so that a
longer time series of data will be necessary before any firm conclusions can be
drawn.-46- -
PsychologicalWell-Being, Suicide, and Crime
There has been some speculation about the effects on individual
behavior of a large cohort of persons who are not making "historical" progress
in their careers. Levy and Michel have argued that the economic effects of
cohort size will generate increasing "selfishness." Others argue that large
cohort size is a cause of conservativism among youth while still others worry
that 'it will have the opposite political effect as persons who have "plateaued"
in their career seek political redress. The only empirical evidence on the
psychological effects of cohort size is the Ahlburg and Schapiro study that
attributes much of the rising suicide rate among young Americans to cohort size.
It predicts a "generational" suicide problem with suicide rates for males above
age 45 rising as the baby boom generation ages and declining for youths as
cohort size falls. Whether cohort size has effects on less dramatic forms of
social and psychological behavior has not been extensviely addressed. A recent
study by Maxim does, however, provide some empirical evidence that juvenile
delinquency rates in Canada were positively associated with cohort size,
controlling for age and period effects.
Social Services
Where we anticipate a major impact of generational crowding is in
the provision of social services. A large cohort is a large voting bloc, with
the potential for enacting social legislation that benefits themselves rather
than other age groups. Already, Preston has provided evidence in the U.S.
that as the ratio of older persons to children has changed, so too have public
expenditures for older persons relative to children. In the political sphere,-47- -
unlikethe market sphere, being a member of a large group is an advantage,
not a disadvantage. Thus, -it -is quite likely that large cohorts will attempt to
compensate for their adverse experience in the labor market by supporting
legislation that benefits them, even though it may be at the expense of smaller
cohorts. For example, the U.S. baby boom is now aged 21 -39and comprises
roughly one-third of the U.S. population. It would not be at all surprising to
see it exert considerable political influence in the direction of social
security and medicare cost containment, policies promoting earlier mandatory
retirement, policies against teenage sub-minimum wages, policies favoring the
development of flexible mortgage -instruments, and tax reforms including the
provision of increased day-care tax credits and increased tax deductions for
dependents.
Summary and Conclusion
This paper has attempted to distinguish between two alternative views
of the labor market problems faced by young workers -in a number of
industrialized countries in the 1970s and early 1980s. The first view is that
the low relative earnings and high unemployment rates experienced by these
workers were largely "aget' related. Although this view carries the implication
that the problems will disappear for recent youth cohorts as theygrow older, -it
also implies that the problems will be "handed over" to successive waves of
youth cohorts as they enter the labor market. The second view is that the labor
market problems of recent youth cohorts are a consequence of their large size.
This view has very different implications since generational crowding can
permanently or temporarily depress the economic position of large cohorts but-48-
need not have an adverse effect on later waves oF smaller youth cohorts.
On the basis of a multi—country empirical analysis of patterns of
cohort size, earnings, unemployment, and the distribution of young workers
across industries, we have four main sets of findings to report.
First, the baby-boom was not uniformly experienced across OECD
economies in terms of either its timing or magnitude. While some countries,
such as Canada, the U.S., and Belgium had large increases in the youth share of
the population from 1965 to 1980, others, notably Japan and Switzerland, had
large decreases.
Second, our empirical results indicate that large cohort size tends
to have a negative effect on the "expected relative earnings" of the cohort,
where expected relative earnings is defined as the product of the earnings and
the employment-to-labor force ratio of a young cohort relative to the same
product for an older cohort. There is, moreover, a marked trade-off betweeh
the relative earnings effect and the relative employment effect with large
cohort sizes reducing relative earnings in some countries and reducing
relative employment in others.
Third, at least for the U.S., the relatively low wages and high
unemployment of the "unlucky cohorts" tend to converge to the patterns that
would have resulted had the cohorts been more "normal" in size, with the
convergence occurring within a decade or so.
Fourth, our results show that baby-boom cohorts were absorbed in
the U.S. and other OECD economies quite evenly across a wide range of
industries. This finding contradicts the popular belief that large youth
cohorts were absorbed primarily through expansion of those industries that
have been traditionally youth-intensive.
Overall, then, our analysis suggests that the heralded "youth"
problem is more than that. It is also a generational problem compounded by the-49-
weak labor market into which the baby boom generation entered. While itis
difficult to separate the effects of cohort size from the effects ofa weak
economy on the progress of the generation, the combination has produced
exceedingly slow progress, with only moderate catch—up from an initially low
earnings or high unemployment position.-50- -
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Tables? in the main text reports percent earnings gaps between
selected youth cohorts that are a fixed number of years older than them. As we
indicated in the text, we also performed a more complex regression analysis,
using the same data, aimed at measuring (1) the extent to which baby boom
cohorts in the U.S. started out their working careers relatively worse off than
older cohorts in terms of their earnings experience and (2) the extent to which
the earnings of baby boom cohorts caught-up with the older cohorts over time.
The key advantage of regression analysis over the simpler analysis of raw
percent differences presented in Tables? is that the regression framework
permits one to control for a variety of other factors which might vary across
cohorts and affect earnings. To the extent that these other factors --suchas
schooling, urban/rural residence, and geographic location --arecorrelated with
both earnings and cohort, their omission could be potentially misleading in
terms of the interpretation of Table.s?. On the other hand, to the extent that
other factors change in response to large cohort size (e.g., schooling
increases because people decide to wait longer before entering the job market),
their inclusion in the model could be a case of "over controlling."
The regressions differ from the simple tables by focusing on usual
weekly earnings for white males rather than on hourly earnings for all males.
These differences have little effect on the results as the alternative earnings
measures move together closely in the CPS data.
The data used in the estimation are drawn from all of the Mayversions of the Current Population Surveys conducted between 1969 and 1981.
From each of these successive cross-sectional surveys, a one-in-five sample was
drawn of white males who were aged 21-44 in 1969 and who had positive earnings.
Thus, the sample follows that same population of individuals through time (i.e.,
individuals aged 21-44 in 1969, 22—45 in 1970, 23—46 in 1971 ,and33-56 in
1981). For each individual in the sample, the following variables were defined:
log of average weekly earnings (in nominal terms), completed years of schooling,
urban or rural residence (i.e., SMSA or non-SMSA), region of residence (North,
South, East, or West), and year inlcuded in the survey.
The thirteen individual cross-sectional files are organized into one
large pseudo-longitudinal file. This large file is divided into strata
according to whether individuals were members of young cohorts in 1969 (i.e.,
21—24, 25—28, or 29—32 years old) or old cohorts in 1969 (i.e., 33-36, 37-40, or
41—44 years old). We also separated out individuals aged 21-24 in 1973 and aged
33—36 in 1973.It should be noted that all individuals in the 13 cross—
sectional data sets were divided into these strata. In other words, an
observation on a 41 year old in the 1981 Current Population Survey would be
grouped with the observations on the 29—32 year olds in 1969. It should also be
noted that the 29-32 year olds in 1969 served double-duty in the empirical
work: they served as both a young cohort in the division of cohorts as of 1969
and as an old cohort in the division of cohorts as of 1973.
After classifying all observations from the 13 Current Population
Surveys in this manner, we then formed them into four sets of data. We did this
by grouping observations involving the three young cohorts in 1969 with
observations on individuals in each of the three older cohorts in that same-55.-
year. This yielded three data sets. A fourth data set was formed by grouping
the 21—24 year old individuals in 1973 with the 33—36year old individuals in
1973.
The main purpose of the empirical exercise we conductedwas to
compare the earnings experience of cohorts born at different points in thebaby
boom with cohorts born before the baby boom. In particular, the cohortthat was
21—24 years old in 1969 was born at the beginning of thebaby boom whereas the
cohort that was 21-24 years old in 1973 was born in the middle of thebaby boom;
all of the other cohorts we have defined were born before thebaby boom and will
serve as benchmarks for our analysis.
The basic model we estimated involved a regression oflogged weekly
earnings on years of schooling, an urban residence dummy, a vector of three
region of residence dummies (one is omitted because the regression includesan
intercept), a vector of year dummies, a young cohort dummy for some baseyear
(either 1969 or 1973), and an interaction term defined as the product of the
young cohort dummy and a time trend. In algebra:




=weeklyearnings of person in ith cohort in year t
X. =vectorof control variables it
C1 =dummyvariable for cohort (=1, if "youth cohort"; 0, if
companion group)
= vectorof year unmiies
Year =trendvariable (1, 2, ...)
Theregressions cover the years 1969-1981. Each regression follows
the two specified cohorts (one younger, one older) through the entire13 year-56— -
period.
The schooling and residence variables are included to control for
standard effects of human capital on earnings. The year dummies are included to
pick up time trends in the movements of nominal earnings. Part of these move-
ments will be due to inflation while other parts will be due to the influence of
business cycle fluctuations and trends in capital formation and productivity
growth. One could try to control for all of these effects by including some
sort of a time trend (e.g., linear, quadratic, or exponential) but that would
impose a smoothness constraint on the combination of different effects.
Although there is no reason to believe that either inflation or the business
cycle or other effects on earnings are smooth over time, we first tried to esti-
mate the models reported in th$$Appendix with a simple linear time trend and
without the time dummies. 8y comparing the results to those we report
we were able to statistically reject the hypothesis of a smooth linear
trend. Thus, we report results which essentially account for a
time trend in the most flexible way possible (i.e., by allowing different inter-
cepts for each year). It is, of course, true that we could have accounted for
some trend movements in earnings by using a standard price index like the CPI to
deflate our nominal earnings data, but that would implicitly make an assumption
that we had a perfect indicator of inflation. Moreover, it would still not
necessarily leave a trend that could be satisfactorily captured by a smooth
trend variable. That is why we adopt a regression specification which expli-
citly deflates the nominal earnings data (because they are expressed in units of
natural logarithms) and picks up other trend influences as well. It is a
completely standard practive in empirical models that use quasi-longitudinal-.57- —
data.
The young cohort dummy is included so that the regression provides an
estimate of the proportionate wage difference between the young and the old
cohorts in the base year. For example, for the regressions in which the young
cohorts were 21-24 years old in either 1969 (the first column of estimates in
Table A.1) or 1973 (the last column of estimates), the coefficient of the young
cohort dummy represents the proportionate difference in the weekly earnings of
the young and old cohorts at roughly the time the young cohort entered the labor
market (and holding constant the other variables in the regression). For the
regressions in which the young cohort was older than 21-24 in 1969, this coef-
ficient represents the proportionate earnings difference at some later point in
the cohorts' experience (i.e., ages 25—28 or 29-32). Finally, the coefficient
of the interaction term represents an estimate of the tendency for the young
cohort's earnings to catch up over time (signified by a positive coefficient) or
to fall further behind (signified by a negative coefficient) the earnings of the
older cohort.
As noted in the main body of text, the estimates presented in Table
A.1 tend to confirm the conclusions suggested by Table 7A in the text. First,
the coefficient of the young cohort dummy is negative in all regressions. This
is merely a reflection of the fact that the earnings profiles of synthetic
cohorts slope upward. Second, the magnitude of the young cohort dummy is
roughly two and one half times greater (in absolute value) in the comparision of
21-24 and 33-36 year olds in 1973 than it is in the comparison of these same-
aged cohorts in 1969. Since 21-24 year olds in 1969 were born at the very start
of the U.S. baby boom (i.e., 1945-1948), whereas the 21-24 year olds -in 1973-58-
were born well into the baby boom (and just a few years before the baby boom hit
its peak), the relative magnitudes of these coefficients suggest that the baby
boom had a substantial negative effect on entry-level earnings.
Third, the coefficients on the interaction terms are all positive,
suggesting that there issomecatch-up in relative earnings as young cohorts
age. Although these estimates tend not to be statistically significant (with
the exception of the estimate contained in the fourth column of results) they
are not totally insignificant in magnitude. For example, the coefficient
estimates in the first column of results suggests an average catch-up of .26
percent per year, or roughly 2.1 percent after 8 years. Thus, by the time the
21-24 year old cohort reaches ages 29-32, its earnings deficiency relative to
the 33-36 year old cohort (which would then be 41-44 years old) would have
declined from 17.1 percent ot 15 percent. If we take the relative earnings
deficiency of 4.7 percent for non-baby boom cohorts aged 29-32 and 41-44 (in the
third column of estimates) as our benchmark, we see that the catch-up amounts to
roughly one-sixth of the total baby-boom effect, after 8 years. However,
according the these estimates there will be no further catch-up after the 8
years since the estimated interaction coefficient is roughly the same for the
cohorts in columns one and three. In other words, young cohorts' earnings tend
to catch up to older cohorts' earnings, whether they are baby-boom cohorts or
not. (We are, however, somewhat hesitant to place substantial emphasis on this
literal implication or our results since it represents an out-of—sample
projection.)
In contrast to the comparison of results -incolumnsone and three, a
comparison of results in columns four and three paints a somewhat different pic--59- -
ture.The interaction term in column four indicates that the estimated catch-up
is statistically significant for the 21-24 year old cohort in 1973 (relative to
the cohort aged 33-36 year) in 1973. It is also economically significant,
taking on a value of nearly 3.6 percent of the 42.4 percent initial difference
in relative earnings. This implies that roughly three-fourths of the earnings
difference between the cohorts would be eliminated after 8 years. Put another
way, it implies that five-sixths of the relative earnings difference we would
otherwise expect (based on the estimate of 4.7 percent on column three), would
disappear after 8 years. These results therefore indicate that the baby-boom
cohort whose earnings started out the lowest was also the cohort which
experienced the greatest degree of catch-up.
In order to gauge the robustness of the results in Table A.1, we have
estimated an alternative specification of a similar model in which the
schooling, urban/rural residence, and region dummy variables are excluded from
the regression. [These estimates, which are presented in Table A.2, may also be
interpreted as a test of the specification underlying the comparison of cohort
earnings patterns in Table 7A of the text (i.e., the main difference is
essentially that the cohort size effects are assumed to have different
functional forms in Table A.2 and 7A.)] As one can clearly see from Table A.2,
dropping the control variables significantly reduces the explanatory power of
the regressions. However, the estimated effects of the baby-boom on entry-level
earnings and the estimated catch-up parameters are very similar in size and
statistical significance across models. The stability of results across model
specifications increases our confidence in these results. Moreover, the finding
that statistical controls do not alter the basic pattern of results also-60-
explains the consistency of the conclusions drawn from Table 7A in the text and
Tables A.1 and A.2 in the Appendix.
Overall, then, the estimates in Tables A.1 and A.2 suggest that baby-
boom cohorts did have a less favorable earnings experience than "comparable"
cohorts born before the baby boom. However, the estimates also provide evidence
that baby-boom cohorts' relative earnings improve over time. But whether the
improvement completely or only partially eliminates the negative effect of
large cohort size is not clearly revealed by our data.Table A.1: Least Squares Estimates of Relative Earnings Patterns for Selected
Pairs of U.S. Cohorts, White Males, Using Data from the May Current Population
Surveys, 1969_1981.*
Dependent Variable: Log of Average Weekly Earnings
Sample Definition:
Youth Cohort Aged21—24 in 196925-28 in 196929-32 in 1969 21—24 in 1973
and
Older Cohort Aged33—36 in 196937-40 in 196941-44 in 1969 33—36 in 1973
Intercept 4.393 4.323 4.326 4.751
(0.025) (0.024) (0.024) (0.033)
Years of Schooling0.040 0.049 0.050 0.049
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002)
Urban Dummy 0.101 0.109 0.104 0.090
(0.009) (.009) (0.009) (0.012)
Young Cohort Dummy -0.171 -0.091 -0.047 -0.424
(at start of (0.015) (.014) (0.014) (0.019)
period)
Young Cohort 0.0026 0.0035 0.0031 0.0357
Dummy x Time Trend (0.0024) (0.0024) (0.0024) (0.0049)
(interaction)
Region Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes
Included **
YearDummies Yes Yes Yes Yes
Included **
R-squared .49 .49 .51 .36
Number of 8427 8132 7475 5354
Observations
*Standard errors are reported in parentheses below estimated coefficients.
**The region dummies (3) and the year dummies (12 for the 1969 regressions and 8








Young Cohort Dummy0.004 0.003 0.004 0.038





*Standard errors are reported in parentheses below coefficient estimates.
Aged
Aged
Table A.2: Estimates of Model Presented in Table A.1 with Year Dummies but No
Other Control Variables*
Dependent Variable: Log of average weekly earnings
Sample Definition
21-24 in 196925-28 in 1969



















Yes Yes Yes Yes
.42 .39 .39 .26Appendix II: Data: Sources, Definitions, and Tables







20+ Average weekly earnings
full time workers.
25-64 Average annual wages






































































25+Table A.4 Youth Employment Data: Explanations and Sources
Country Youth Age GroupSource Sectors
U.S. 15-24 Census of Popu-
lation
Japan 15-24 Annual Report on 1.Trans. and Comm. includes
the Labor ForceElectricity, Gas, Water,
Survey Steam, and Hot water supply.
2.F.I.R.E. includes Insurance
and Real Estate only
Germany 15-24 Belvolkerung 1.Mining includes electricity,
und Erwerb- gas, and water.





workers -in Private households
and non-prof-it industry only.
Sweden 16-24 Arbetskrafts- 1.Min'ing and Manf. includes
undersokningen electricity, gas, and water
(Statistika 2.Wholesale & Retail Trade
Centrubyran) includes restaurants & hotels.
3.Transportation and Commun.
Finland 15-24 Labor Force includes storage.
Survey, Central4.Business & Repair services
Statistical include Business Services only
Office of 5.Public Administration and
Finland Personal Services include
Community, Social and Personal
Norway 16-24 Labor Market Service workers only.
StatisticsTable A.5: Earnings of Youths1 Relative to Adults, Males, 1966_19842 (percent)
Year Australia Canada France Japan SwedenUK USA
1966 NA NA 50.00 52.88 40.46 NA NA
1967 NA 55.76 49.99 52.71 42.70 NA 74.00
1968 NA NA 50.63 54.00 41.94 NA NA
1969 NA 52.10 53.09 55.27 43.19 NA 73.00
1970 NA NA 53.47 56.00 48.68 NA 70.00
1971 NA 51.05 53.47 57.01 48.08 NA 66.00
1972 NA 49.65 52.48 58.49 47.85 NA 66.00
1973 NA 53.89 52.99 58.50 47.16 43.46 67.00
1974 NA 55.47 52.00 58.98 48.44 48.79 67.00
1975 68.48 54.51 51.02 58.99 53.18 51.13 64.00
1976 66.53 55.63 50.98 58.35 53.14 49.57 64.00
1977 67.59 60.31 50.46 57.23 53.10 50.05 62.00
1978 66.59 54.95 49.93 57.10 54.55 50.01 63.00
1979 66.65 58.57 48.41 56.49 53.01 49.97 62.00
1980 66.27 52.25 47.88 55.38 53.93 49.40 60.00
1981 67.25 55.43 NA 55.35 54.92 48.61 59.00
1982 65.83 51.26 NA 54.84 54.39 48.26 56.00
1983 64.92 NA NA 54.74 54.38 46.89 55.00
1984 NA NA NA 54.71 NA NA NA
Source: See Table A.3.
NA means not available.
1. Youth earnings are weighted averages of earnings of the two youth groups
described in Table A.3, where populations of males 15-19 and 20-24 years old
are used as weights (except for the U.S. where earnings data are reported for
20-24 year olds and hence do not require weighting).
2. This chart corresponds to Figures 1A and lB.Table A.6: Unemployment of Youths Relative to Adults' Males, 1965_19832
Year AustraliaCanada France Japan Sweden UK USA
1965 NA 2.23 NA 2.00 2.80 NA 3.12
1966 2.11 2.37 NA 1.33 2.63 NA 3.20
1967 2.56 2.31 NA 2.11 2.29 NA 3.50
1968 2.86 2.31 2.45 1.90 2.18 NA 3.88
1969 2.43 2.47 2.60 2.11 2.31 NA 3.94
1970 2.71 2.63 3.25 2.33 2.78 NA 3.37
1971 2.88 2.60 2.36 2.56 2.82 1.84 3.23
1972 2.71 2.69 2.82 2.45 3.00 2.00 3.53
1973 3.88 2.69 2.90 2.50 2.94 1.77 3.60
1974 2.85 2.70 3.10 2.45 3.27 2.00 3.47
1975 3.26 2.91 3.05 2.19 3.50 2.83 2.74
1976 3.64 3.07 3.05 1.89 3.63 2.85 2.83
1977 3.76 2.98 3.55 2.50 3.36 2.81 2.93
1978 3.46 2.83 3.08 2.44 3.47 2.80 3.21
1979 3.83 2.87 2.93 2.25 3.69 2.72 3.21
1980 3.47 2.80 3.39 2.67 4.09 2.96 2.72
1981 3.00 2.84 3.31 2.47 3.47 2.27 2.76
1982 3.02 2.48 3.71 2.37 3.70 2.57 2.27
1983 2.71 2.33 3.86 2.30 3.39 2.37 2.14
Source: OECD Labour Force Statistics 1962-1982, Part III, 1984.
NA means not available.
1. Figures are ratios of unemployment rates of 15-24 year olds (16-24 year
olds to those in the U.S., UK and Sweden) of 25-54 year olds.
2. This chart corresponds to Figures 2A and 2B.